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Russell-Names: An Introduction to Millian Descriptivism 
 
 
This essay is devoted to the discussion of expressions of a particular, and, as far as I can tell, 
not previously discussed type. I call them Russell-names. 
The occurrence of ÔRussellÕ in ÔRussell-nameÕ is an allusion to certain aspects of Bertrand 
RussellÕs theory of names, which have provided the initial inspiration for my projectÑfirst 
and foremost, his idea that Ôordinary proper namesÕ are abbreviations of definite 
descriptions.
1
 Admittedly, this Ôinitial inspirationÕ yields me to conclusions that bear little 
resemblance with anything Russell may have wished to say about ordinary names, or for that 
matter about any other expression. But my aims here are neither historical nor exegetical: 
rather, my superficial homage to Russell serves as a reminder of the descriptivist aspects in 
his analysis of proper names, which, in a sense that will hopefully become clearer as I 
proceed, continue to reverberate in my treatment of Russell-names.
2
 
My initial gesture towards the descriptive dimension of Russell-names is meant to provide 
a noteworthy contrast with the other part of the moniker I have chosen for my concoctions: 
Russell-names deserve the label ÔnamesÕ because they are intended to conform to what I take 
to be the fundamental semantic properties of proper names, namely their rigidity, direct-
referentiality, and non-indexicality. These are admittedly not properties that everybody 
happily attributes to proper names. Yet, my aim here is not that of defending my own views 
about names: in principle, what I propose remains consistent with the notions that none, 
some, or perhaps all among the expressions commonly classified as names are Russell-
names. Still, my point is also not that of a mere formal exercise, with no bearing on the 
current debate on proper names: although, in a sense, my treatment of Russell-names follows 
unashamedly descriptive lines, these expressions do nevertheless conform to the semantic 
                                                
1
 See for instance Russell 1905, Russell 1911, and Russell 1918. 
2
 The form of descriptivism at issue in what follows strikes me as Russellian also because of its insistence on 
certain semantically relevant relationships between our respective explananda (ordinary names in RussellÕs 
case, Russell-names in mine) and descriptively well-endowed expressionsÑas opposed to, say, Frege-inspired 
descriptive senses. The apparatus I put forth in what follows may nevertheless be amenable to developments and 
amendments consistent with a variety of alternative versions of the descriptivist standpoint. An unrelated 
historical note is also appropriate at this stage: although I (loosely) follow some of RussellÕs insights about the 
relationships between names and descriptions, I take on board without further ado a relatively non-Russellian 
approach to the latter (see section two); an analysis closer to the letter of RussellÕs treatment of definite 
descriptions should nevertheless be easily derivable from what I write, with opportune modifications and 
adjustments. 
 2 
pattern customarily associated with traditionally rabidly anti-descriptivist approaches, first 




When it comes to proper names, then, my conclusion is ecumenical. From the viewpoint 
of descriptivism, the conceivability of Russell-names provides welcome relief from the 
pressure exerted by considerations at odds with a flaccid and/or indexical treatment of proper 
names: even if the arguments in favour of Millianism are on the right track, so I conclude, not 
all versions of descriptivism should thereby be abandoned. Conversely, from a Millian 
standpoint, the conceivability of Russell-names indicates that the Millian stance, far from 
providing a meagre picture of names as Ômere tagsÕ, is at least in principle consistent with the 
recognition of their semantic bonds with richer descriptive material: the conclusion that 
certain expressions are non-indexical devices of rigid designation does not entail a picture in 
which their semantic properties are exhausted by their referential profile.
 
 
The first three sections of this essay are devoted to a preliminary informal introduction of 
the main ideas guiding my treatment of Russell-names: the notion of ÔabbreviationÕ, the sense 
in which Russell-names are Ôassociated withÕ definite descriptions, and the double-context 
framework I develop for their semantic analysis. Sections four, five, and six provide a more 
rigorous formal presentation of these ideas, and of their consequences for the relationships 
between descriptivism and Millianism. The Appendix puts forth a simple artificial language 
as a test study for the model-theoretic development of my double-context semantics, and as a 
presentation of the formal properties of the main concepts introduced throughout this essay.  
 
 
1. Preliminaries A: Abbreviations and Associations 
As far as I can tell, Russell is not particularly explicit when it comes to the relationship of 
abbreviation allegedly holding between ordinary proper names and definite descriptions. In 
my Russell-inspired account, the idea of abbreviation is glossed in terms of a certain 
                                                
3
 In the previous paragraph, I described my views on proper names as also committed to the idea that these 
expressions are devices of direct reference. Direct reference is a position within the framework of so-called 
propositional semantics, namely the notion that sentences containing occurrences of proper names express 
singular propositions. Since (i) the main ideas in what follows may be presented from the simpler and more 
familiar viewpoint of an intensional semantics for indexical languages, and (ii) these ideas may easily be 
rephrased in propositional terms, the notion of direct-reference remains in the background in my exposition, and 
is relegated to a few footnotes (see in particular footnotes 10, 12, 16, and 19). For considerations on the 
relationships between direct reference and rigidity see Kaplan 1977, Devitt 1981, Salmon 1981, Salmon 1986, 
Kaplan 1989, Recanati 1993, Marti 1995, and Marti 2003. 
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relationship between (i) utterances of sentences involving Russell-names and (ii) certain 
syntactic constructs appropriate for their semantic evaluation. This section is devoted to an 
informal explanation of the sort of relationship I have in mind, and of the sense in which the 
syntactic constructs mentioned in (ii) are Ôappropriate forÕ the semantic evaluation of 
utterances of Russell-names. After a few additional preliminaries in sections two and three, 
these ideas are studied in greater detail in section four, before my official treatment of 
Russell-names in section five. 
Consider a community of Russell-speakers, that is, a community of users of a Russell-
language involving Russell-names. The Appendix at the end of this essay presents a simple 
fragment as an exemplar of a Russell-language, and discusses its semantic properties from 
the viewpoint of the formal framework I introduce in section three. At this initial stage, it is 
however pedagogically convenient to begin with an informal sketch of a Russell-language, 
temporarily assumed to be indistinguishable from a simple fragment of ordinary English, 
with the possible exception of the occurrence of Russell-names within its lexicon. In 
particular, I adopt as my Russell-name of choice the expression ÔBismarckÕ (in italics, so as to 
distinguish it from the ordinary proper name ÔBismarckÕ), and I focus on a Russell-speakerÕs 
utterance u1 of 
(1) Bismarck was a conservative. 
This section continues with a preliminary discussion of what (1) abbreviates on the occasion 
of u1, and of the sense in which the abbreviated construct provides the basis for the semantic 
analysis of that utterance.
4
 
As may already be apparent from my mention of Ôoccasions of utteranceÕ, the choice of 
what is being abbreviated by (1) on the occasion of u1 is for me a context-dependent business. 
In particular, I assume that an utterance u by a Russell-speaker is suitably connected with an 
association a, and that the abbreviation appropriate on the occasion for u depends on the 
properties of its connected association a. The details in the informal idea of a ÔconnectionÕ 
are of no immediate relevance at this stage, and their discussion may safely be relegated to a 
few footnotes.
5
 As for the target of the connection-relation, the following informal 
understanding of associations suffices for the purpose of this introduction (see section four 
for a more detailed presentation).  
                                                
4
 I proceed by focusing on examples involving occurrence of one Russell-name; my comments are easily 
generalizable to more complex  instances. 
5
 See footnotes 7 and 24. 
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Informally, think of an association as an utterance of a sentence of the form: let Russell-
name r be associated with description d.
6
 In particular, taking inspiration from RussellÕs 
treatment of the ordinary proper name ÔBismarckÕ, suppose that the aforementioned utterance 
u1 is connected with the association: let the Russell-name ÔBismarckÕ be associated with the 
description Ôthe first Chancellor of the German EmpireÕ. I refer to d, in this case Ôthe first 
Chancellor of the German EmpireÕ, as the associated description for the Russell-name r, here 
ÔBismarckÕ, as it occurs on that occasion.
7
 
Let then Sr be a sentence containing occurrences of a Russell-name r, and let ur be an 
utterance of Sr with d as rÕs associated description. I take Sr, as it occurs on that occasion, to 
be the abbreviation of a sentence resulting from substituting each occurrence of r in Sr with 
an expression ÔinvolvingÕ d, in a sense of ÔinvolvementÕ more fully investigated as I proceed. 
So, the sentence (1), as uttered in the aforementioned circumstances for u1, is the abbreviation 
of a construct of the form 
(2) ... the first Chancellor of the German Empire was a conservative, 
that is, it is the abbreviation of the result of substituting the occurrence of ÔBismarckÕ in (1) 
with an expression involving the description associated with that Russell-name on that 
occasion.  
Since u1 is an utterance of a sentence containing a Russell-name, its semantic profile ought 
to reflect the sort of semantic properties that I have assumed to be appropriate for these 
expressions. In particular, u1 ought to bear properties consistent with a rigid and non-
indexical approach to ÔBismarckÕ, in agreement with my assumption that Russell-names 
conform to the Millian pattern for ordinary proper names. Since I have also anticipated that 
the semantic properties of u1 depend on the semantic interpretation of what is being 
abbreviated on that occasion, this much imposes important constraints on the completion of 
(2): what is desired is a sentence which, if suitably interpreted, is able to render the sort of 
                                                
6
 Given appropriate conditionsÑI leave aside the interesting but semantically tangential issues pertaining to the 
type of speech act at issue in the case of associations, and of the requirements for its felicitous performance. 
7
 Taking this scenario as exemplar, the following two families of approaches to the idea of connection (possibly 
among others) remain compatible with the approach I pursue in this essay. (i) According to a subjectivist view, 
connections are affairs within the speakerÕs mental domain, as in a Russell-speakerÕs  recollection, when using 
ÔBismarckÕ, of her previous decision to associate any future token of that expression with Ôthe first Chancellor of 
the German EmpireÕ. (ii) According to a deferential alternative I find more palatable, a Russell-speakerÕs 
utterance of ÔBismarckÕ is connected with a possibly distant event, such as someoneÕs association of ÔBismarckÕ 
with Ôthe first Chancellor of the German EmpireÕ, for instance due to that utteranceÕs position within a wider 
socio-linguistic network, or its occurrence within a Ôchain of transmissionÕ originating with that association. 
Deferentialists may do worse than studying the considerable debate on the so-called ÔCausal TheoryÕ of proper 
namesÑsee among many Donnellan 1970, Evans 1973, Kripke 1980, Devitt 1981, Evans 1982, Evans 1985, 
and Dickie 2011. 
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verdicts I expect to be appropriate for u1. Accordingly, the next two sections sketch a slightly 
more accurate presentation of what is being abbreviated by a Russell-speakerÕs utterance, and 
of the semantic resources needed for its interpretation.  
Section two begins with a brief discussion of an initially promising but ultimately 
inadequate strategy: the idea that constructs such as (2) are to be developed by embedding the 
definite description, in this case the associated description for ÔBismarckÕ, within the scope of 
the operator ÔdthatÕ. Though inadequate, this dthat-gambit provides a pedagogically useful 
term of contrast with my own proposal, informally introduced in section three and more fully 
investigated in the second half of this essay. 
 
 
2. Preliminaries B: Rigidity and the Dthat-Gambit 
Take then (1) again, and my incomplete presentation of what it abbreviates on the occasion of 
u1: 
(1) Bismarck was a conservative. 
(2) ... the first Chancellor of the German Empire was a conservative. 
As mentioned above, the relation of abbreviation is of semantic relevance, in the sense that 
the semantic properties of an utterance are to be derived from the interpretation of what is 
being abbreviated on that occasion. A more detailed explanation of this idea will have to wait 
until section four, after the discussion of certain subtleties that are best left aside at this stage. 
Still, even now, it ought to be sufficiently clear that the ellipsis at the beginning of (2) may 
not be understood as a typographically idle flourish. In other words: it ought to be sufficiently 
clear that what is being abbreviated on the occasion for u1 is not simply what results from 
substituting ÔBismarckÕ with its associated description, as in 
(3) the first Chancellor of the German Empire was a conservative. 
This is so because, at least given a standard approach to the expressions in (3), this sentence 
is endowed with properties I have assumed to be inappropriate in the case of u1, first and 
foremost, as I explain in what follows, its flaccid (non-rigid) propensities. 
Since rigidity is a modal notion, I briefly rehearse these familiar considerations by 
appealing to the standard framework for intensional semantics. In this framework, an 
expression e is associated with an intension [[e]], in turn understood as a function yielding a 
 6 
semantic value (extension) [[e]](w) with respect to a point of evaluation w.
8
 Leaving aside as 
obvious or irrelevant the details pertaining to the interpretation of the verb-phrase in (3), the 
following hypothesis regarding the intension of the expression in subject position suffices for 
my purposes: for any definite description d of the form the F, 
  [[d]] = the intension f such that, for any point w, f(w) = the unique i ∈ [[F]]w 
if any such exists, where [[e]]w is a more familiar typographical format for [[e]](w).
9
 As a 
result, given further obvious semantic clauses, (3) turns out to be true or false with respect to 
w depending on the political convictions of whoever first served as German Chancellor at w, 
in contrast with the rigid reading assumed as appropriate for (1). 
As far as I can tell, something along the lines of (3) may well have been the sort of 
abbreviation Russell had in mind for sentences containing the ordinary proper name 
ÔBismarckÕ. In all likelihood, then, the search for a non-trivial completion of (2) abandons the 
letter of RussellÕs descriptivism, and at best pursues what may vaguely be described as a 
ÔRussell-inspiredÕ take on Russell-names. Still, Russellian exegesis aside, the notion that 
ordinary proper names may be regimented as constructs properly including a definite 
description has played a prominent role in the contemporary debate between descriptivism 
and Millianism (and, for that matter, between descriptivism and alternative non-descriptivist 
viewpoints). Among different options, a particular strategy in this vein deserves to be 
mentioned at this stage. 
According to the view I have in mind, the semantics of proper names is appropriately 
reflected by certain artificial constructs properly involving definite descriptions: dthat-terms. 
The semantics for dthat-terms appeals to an apparatus richer than the simple intensional 
system sketched above, the framework of so-called double-index semantics for indexical 
intensional languages.
10
 According to the double-index approach, an expression e is assigned 
an intension [[e]]c with respect to a context c, typically represented as an n-tuple including a 
                                                
8
 Throughout these informal sections, I leave aside questions having to do with the relativisation of semantic 
values to models (see Appendix). For the sake of typographical simplicity, I also eschew mention of 
assignments of values to variables: my treatment of definite descriptions is easily adaptable to more customary 
approaches to ÔtheÕ as a quantifier, as in Ôthe x: FxÕ (for an overview, see Neale 1990). I also tend to think of 
points of evaluation merely as possible worlds, but no significant issues arise from alternative accounts (see 
Kaplan 1977 for a view of points as world-time pairs, and Klbel 2002 for richer formats). 
9
 For reasons of space, I hereinafter simply leave aside issues of non-existence and/or non-uniqueness, and I 
proceed by leaving the caveat Ôif any such existsÕ as implicit throughout my informal considerations in the main 
body of this essay. 
10
 As noted in Kaplan 1989, ÔdthatÕ has been ambiguously introduced in Kaplan 1977. Given my focus on 
intensional semantics, it is the so-called Ôrigidifying operatorÕ interpretation that comes to the foreground in the 
main text of this essayÑsee footnote 12 for considerations from the viewpoint of propositional semantics.  
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speaker ca, a time ct, and a possible world cw.
11
 Consequently, the assignment of semantic 
values becomes a doubly-relativized affair: [[e]]c(w), or more concisely [[e]]c,w, is the 
semantic value of e with respect to a context c and a point of evaluation w. Then, given a 
description d of the form the F,  
 [[dthat(d)]]c = the intension f such that, for any point w, f(w) = the unique i ∈ [[F]]c,cw.  
As a result, given a few obvious further hypotheses, 
(4) dthat(the first Chancellor of the German Empire) was a conservative 
ends up being true or false with respect to a context c and a point of evaluation w iff, given 
the way things went ÔinÕ cw, the class of conservatives in w includes whoever served as 
German chancellor in cwÑin the case of Ôour contextÕ, it ends up being true with respect to a 
point w iff, in w, Otto von Bismarck pursued a right-wing political agenda.
12
 
Given my focus in this essay, I can afford to remain indifferent to the question whether 
anything resembling this dthat-gambit paves the way for a satisfactory treatment of ordinary 
proper names.
13
 As for Russell-names, the idea that (4) is what is being abbreviated by (1) on 
the occasion in which u1 takes place is a non-starter. This is so because Russell-names are 
intended to conform to the semantic properties that Millianism attributes to names, and 
because for a Millian (and for that matter for a considerable number of non-Millians) proper 
names are not indexical expressions. Yet, as reflected by my mention of Ôour contextÕ in the 
gloss for (4), dthat-terms are indexical, in the sense that they are associated with different 
intensions with respect to different contexts. As a result, silently taking on board the obvious 
compositional clauses for (4), [[(4)]]c1 may be a different intension from [[(4)]]c2 even if c1w 
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 The characterization of ca as the ÔspeakerÕ is (here harmlessly) sloppy, see Kaplan 1977. In my Appendix, I 
simplify my exposition by restricting contexts to two parameters, an agent and a possible world. 
12
 Within so-called propositional semantics, sentences are associated with a structured content (with respect to 
a context), typically represented as an n-tuple consisting of the contents of the expressions occurring in them 
(see for instance Salmon 1986). The contribution offered by a directly referential expression to the content of a 
sentence in which it occurs is customarily characterized as Ôan individualÕ, and the corresponding contents are 
described as singular (see Fitch and Nelson 2014 for introductory considerations). According to KaplanÕs 
allegedly ÔintendedÕ view of ÔdthatÕ as a device of direct reference, the content of dthat(d) (at c) is the unique 
individual who satisfies d at cw (see Kaplan 1977 and Kaplan 1989). 
13
 For discussions of rigidifying strategies in the vicinity of the dthat-gambit, see among many Plantinga 1974, 
Kaplan 1977, Plantinga 1978, Salmon 1981, Kaplan 1989, Recanati 1993, Soames 1995, Soames 1998, Soames 
2002, Soames 2003, Caplan 2005, and Caplan 2007. Rigidifying mechanisms of this sort also typically (though 
not inevitably) play a role in the increasingly fashionable neo-descriptivist positions roughly inspired by Burge 
1973 (for different versions, see for instance Bach 1981, Katz 1990, Geurts 1997, Bach 2002, Elbourne 2005, 
and Matushansky 2008). For an interestingly idiosyncratic approach to rigidity (of individual constants within a 
model-theoretically interpreted formal language) see also Gler and Pagin 2006. 
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and c2w agree when it comes to the class of conservatives, as long as different individuals 
serve as first German Chancellors in those circumstances.
14
  
Still, its shortcomings notwithstanding, the dthat-gambit summarized in this section 
indirectly hints at an intriguing formal stratagem. As I explain in the next section, given 
certain important modifications, this ploy paves the way for a double-context framework in 
which Russell-names conform to the desired Millian constraints.  
 
 
3. Preliminaries C: Double-Context 
Metaphorically speaking, ÔdthatÕ neutralizes a definite descriptionÕs sensitivity towards points 
of evaluation by anchoring its interpretation to an independent relatum: [[(4)]]c yields Truth 
at a point w depending solely on the political allegiances of cwÕs Chancellor, regardless of the 
properties of the individual at the head of the German government in w. This strategy may 
naturally be mirrored within the project of a Millian treatment of Russell-names, as long as 
their associated descriptions are interpreted not only independently of the peculiarities of this 
or that point of evaluation, but also independently of the parameters relevant for the 
interpretation of indexical expressions. As I explain in what follows, this much invites a 
modification of the double-index apparatus from section two into a triply relativized affairÑ
more precisely, for reasons I am about to explain, into a framework in which points of 
evaluation are accompanied by two contextual parameters. 
Recall the informal idea of an association from section one, understood as some sort of 
event in which a Russell-name is associated with a description. Being events involving the 
use of language, associations take place within a particular setting: at a certain time and in a 
particular possible world, someone establishes an appropriate relationship between a Russell-
name and a description. For reasons that will become apparent as I proceed, a few features of 
this collection of parameters are worthy of attention, and indirectly provide the intuitive 
background for my double-context approach to Russell-languages.  
These hints are perhaps most perspicuously explained by appealing to associations 
involving straightforwardly indexical expressionsÑand, for the sake of clarity, a different 
exemplar of a Russell-name: ÔNapoleonÕ. Take then an utterance u5 of 
                                                
14
 Independently, of course, of any indexical element possibly introduced by the predicate, such as verbal tense. 
For indexical views of names see Voltolini 1995 and Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998. For criticisms see Kaplan 
1977, Kaplan 1989, Perry 2001, Predelli 2001, and Predelli 2009. 
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(5) Napoleon is about to defeat Russia now 
taking place in 1856. According to common consensus, the occurrence of ÔnowÕ in this 
example is to be interpreted with respect to the context for u5, presumably a context that 
includes the time of utterance as its temporal parameter. As a result, given certain further 
obvious regularities, u5 is to be evaluated as true or false depending on the outcome of the 
conflict in which Russia was involved in 1856, towards the end of the Crimean War. Yet, 
suppose also that u5 is connected with an association that appeals to an overtly indexical 
description, as in the association u6  
(6) let ÔNapoleonÕ be associated with Ôthe Emperor of the French nowÕ 
taking place in 1815. It would seem to be in principle possible to suggest that the 
interpretation of the indexical ÔnowÕ mentioned in (6) ought to be derived on the basis of the 
context for u6, that is, a context with 1815 as its temporal co-ordinate. In other words: it 
would seem to be in principle possible to demand that u5 be evaluated as true iff whoever was 
Emperor of the French in 1815 is about to defeat Russia in 1856Ñthat is, on the assumption 
that u5 and u6 take place in the actual world, iff Napoleon I is within sight of a victorious 
conclusion to the Crimean War. 
I take this suggestion as a promising start for my account of Russell-names. What it entails 
is a double-context apparatus, with one context, as usual, in charge of the interpretation of the 
indexical overtly appearing at the end of (5), and a different context devoted to identifying 
the individual determined by the association of ÔNapoleonÕ with the description in (6). I refer 
to the different roles played by these contexts in terms of the distinction between contexts of 
interpretation and contexts of association. So (5), or more accurately what it abbreviates on 
the occasion of u5,  
 É the Emperor of the French now is about to defeat Russia now, 
demands to be interpreted by anchoring the occurrences of ÔnowÕ respectively to a context of 
association k and a context of interpretation c, such that kt is the time of u6, the association of 
ÔNapoleonÕ with Ôthe Emperor of the French nowÕ, and ct is the time at which u5 occurs.  
I thus propose a double-context semantic framework for Russell-languages, in which an 
expression e is assigned an intension [[e]]k,c with respect to a context of association k and a 
context of interpretation c, and hence derivatively a semantic value [[e]]k,c,w with respect to k, 
c, and a point of evaluation w. In turn, this framework provides the resources needed for the 
modification of the dthat-gambit to which I alluded at the beginning of this section. I 
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implement this modification in terms of an alternative to ÔdthatÕ, an operator ÔRusÕ defined 
along the following lines: for any description d of the form Ôthe FÕ, contexts k and c, and 
point of evaluation w, 
 [[Rus(d)]]k,c = the intension f such that, for any w, f(w) = the unique i ∈ [[F]]k,c,kw. 
Returning to my original example, and armed with the resources provided by the double-
context framework and by ÔRusÕ, I then propose (7) as a completion of (2), the sentence 
abbreviated by (1) on the circumstances of u1 (sentences repeated for the sake of legibility): 
(1) Bismarck was a conservative 
(2) ... the first Chancellor of the German Empire was a conservative 
(7) Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire) was a conservative. 
Much remains to be said at this stage. The following sections are devoted to a more 
rigorous presentation of the hints put forth thus far, and to an explanation of how they 
provide the background for an analysis of Russell-names compatible with the desiderata put 
forth at the beginning of this essay. In the next section, I return to the idea of the association 
of a Russell-name with a definite description, now formally regimented from the viewpoint 
of the double-context framework informally outlined in this section. In section five, I present 
the semantic properties of the constructs relevant for the semantic evaluation of utterances of 
Russell-names, namely the Rus-terms introduced above, and I explain how they manage to 
reflect the rigid and non-indexical properties that warrant the occurrence of ÔnameÕ in 
ÔRussell-nameÕ, according to the Millian view of names. In section six, I conclude with the 
discussion of certain descriptivist features of Russell-names, and of a few related logical 
consequences of my approach to Russell-languages.  
 
 
4. Semantics A: Utterances and Expansions  
According to the picture from section one, a Russell-speakerÕs utterance of a sentence 
containing occurrences of a Russell-name is connected with an association. Accordingly, an 
utterance may formally be represented by coupling the traditional sentence-context 
representation of utterances with an association, as in 
 u = <<S, c>, a> 
 11 
where S is a sentence, c is a context, and a is an association.
15
 Since the semantically relevant 
components of associations have to do with the pairing of Russell-names with definite 
descriptions, I further formalize associations as triples consisting of these expressions, side 
by side with an appropriate contextual parameter. Continuing to focus for simplicityÕs sake 
on scenarios involving occurrences of one Russell-name, then, an utterance is now formally 
understood as a pair 
(8) u = <<S, c>, <r, d, k>> 
with S and c as above, r a Russell-name, d a description, and k a context. In an informal gloss 
of this format, (8) expresses the idea of an utterance of S in a context (of interpretation) c, 
connected with an association in a context (of association) k of the Russell-name r with the 
description d. For instance, the utterance u1 from section one ends up being representable as 
the pair 
(9) u1 = <<Bismarck was a conservative, c>, <Bismarck, the first Chancellor of the 
German Empire, k>> 
with c and k including the speaker, time, etc. appropriate respectively for that utterance and 
for the association with which it is connected. 
In these informal sections, my Russell-language of choice includes a few not further 
analysed predicates (Ôwas a conservativeÕ, Ôis about to defeat Russia nowÕ), side by side with 
a couple of Russell-names (ÔBismarckÕ, ÔNapoleonÕ; see the Appendix for a more precise 
presentation of a formal Russell-language LR). I refer to the language appropriate for the 
presentation of the constructs abbreviated by Russell-names as that Russell-languageÕs 
expansion (in the Appendix, L*R). In my presentation thus far, such an expansion is deprived 
of Russell-names, but is endowed with a stock of definite descriptions (Ôthe first Chancellor 
of the German EmpireÕ, Ôthe French Emperor nowÕ) and with the operator Rus. According to 
the idea of abbreviation described in section one, then, given an association <r, d, k>, a 
sentence S of a Russell-language abbreviates a sentence S* of its expansion, where S* results 
from S by substituting all occurrences of r in S with Rus(d). So, for instance, given the 
association appropriate for u1, namely the association described by the second member of (9), 
(1) abbreviates (7), the result of substituting ÔBismarckÕ with ÔRus(the first Chancellor of the 
German Empire)Õ. 
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 For the formal understanding of ÔutteranceÕ as a sentence-context pair see Kaplan 1977. The idea of 
association is here formalized along lines appropriate for my simple examples involving occurrences of one 
Russell-nameÑthe generalization to instances with a plurality of these expressions is straightforward. 
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Finally, let the expansion of an utterance u of the form (8) be the triple 
 u* = <S*, c, k> 
that is, the triple consisting of the sentence abbreviated by S on the occasion of u, of the 
context of interpretation appropriate for u, and of the context for its connected association. 
(ÔExpansionÕ thus ambiguously applies to languages and utterances, but no confusion is likely 
to arise from this equivocation). In the case of u1, for instance, its expansion is the triple 
 u1* = <Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire) was a conservative, c, k> 
with c and k as above.  
In turn, these ideas provide the background for a more precise formulation of the notion 
that the semantic interpretation of a Russell-speakerÕs utterance Ôdepends onÕ the semantic 
properties of a certain description-involving construct. In particular, I define a predicate 
ÔtrueÕ for utterances of sentences in a Russell-language as follows: given an utterance u 
whose expansion is u* = <S*, c, k>,  
(10) true(u) iff truec,k (S*),  
given a not yet explained a predicate truec,k for sentences in the expansion of that Russell-
language.
16
 So, for example, u1 ends up being evaluated as true exactly on the condition that 
(7) is truek,c, where k and c are as in (9).  
The analysis of truec,k is the topic of the next section, devoted to the compositional 
analysis of sentences in a Russell-languageÕs expansion. Since the characteristic feature of 
this language has to do with the presence of Rus-terms, I focus my presentation on the 
resources required for their interpretation, starting with the reflection of the informal notion 
of ÔmeaningÕ within a double-context framework. The resulting distinction between the 
classic idea of character and what I call an expressionÕs ÔcountenanceÕ leads me to the 
explanation of how Rus-terms, and hence derivatively Russell-names, are endowed with 
constant characters and constant intentions, consistently with the Millian demands of non-
indexicality and rigidity. In section six, I conclude with the discussion of certain ÔlogicalÕ 
properties ensuing from my definition of truec,k, which in turn indirectly highlight certain 
properties of Russell-languages and of their expansions that are particularly palatable from a 
descriptivist viewpoint.  
 
                                                
16
 Mutatis mutandis, a parallel strategy may be implemented for other semantic notions, such as the idea of 
ÔcontentÕ from the viewpoint of a propositional framework. 
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5. Semantics B: Countenance and Character 
In the standard framework for indexical languages, expressions are assigned a certain 
primitive semantic property, character, formally understood as a function from contexts to 
intensions.
17
 So, the character {e} of an expression e is the function which, given a context c 
as its argument, yields {e}(c), or, in the notation from section two, [[e]]c, the intension of e 
with respect to c.
18
  
In my double-context framework, on the other hand, what is endowed with a character is 
not an expression simpliciter, but a pair consisting of an expression and a context (of 
association), as in: {e, k}, the character of e with respect to k. In particular, as indicated 
above, Rus-terms are endowed with a certain character with respect to a context k1, but with a 
possibly distinct character with respect to a different context k2. For instance,  
 {Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire), k1}  
is the constant character f1 such that, for any context c, f1(c) is the constant intension yielding 
the unique individual who served as the first Chancellor of the German Empire in k1w. But  
 {Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire), k2}  
is the distinct constant character f2 responsible for the constant intension concerned with 
whoever preceded all other Imperial Chancellors in k2w. 
From the viewpoint of double-context semantics, then, character is a derived semantic 
property, systematically obtainable on the basis of a certain primitive property of an 
expression, together with a context. I call this property of an expression e its countenance, 
written as |e| and understood as a function from contexts (of association) to characters. In 
particular,  
 |Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire)|  
is the countenance g such that, for any context k, g(k) is the character {Rus(the first 
Chancellor of the German Empire), k} of the kind described in the foregoing paragraph.
19
  
                                                
17
 I label this property as semantically ÔprimitiveÕ in the sense that, in a classic framework for indexical 
intensional languages, the character of an expression is a fundamental, non-derived propertyÑin the case of a 
model-theoretic approach to non-fully interpreted languages, a property that is attributed to non-constant 
expressions by the modelÕs interpretation function, see Kaplan 1977. 
18
 I borrow this notation from Kaplan 1977; for comments on character see among others Braun 1995. 
19
 From a propositional viewpoint, of course, the definition of ÔRusÕ is to be adapted so as to obtain results 
consistent with the demands of direct referentiality, as in (roughly): for any k and c, the content of Rus(the first 
 14 
In the standard framework for indexical languages, sentences are assigned a semantic-
value (truth-value) with respect to a context and a point, according to the customary 
compositional regularitiesÑas in [[S]]c,w, the truth-value of S with respect to c and w. A 
singly relativized predicate truec is then standardly defined as in 
 truec(S) iff [[S]]c,cw = T, 
i.e., iff S is assigned the semantic value T with respect to c and the point determined by c.
20
 
Unsurprisingly, a similar move within a double-context framework yields doubly-relativized 
truth-predicates, such as, in particular, 
 truek,c(S) iff [[S]]k,c,cw = T. 
Swiftly adapting these remarks to the case of (7), repeated here  
(7) Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire) was a conservative, 
truek,c(7) iff (7) is assigned the semantic value T when evaluated with respect to the contexts 
k and c and the point cw, that is, iff the first German Chancellor in kw is such that he is a 
conservative in cw. Since, according to (10) from section four, an utterance with <S*, k, c> as 
its expansion is true iff truek,c(S*), it follows that u1, the utterance of (1) from section one, is 
true as long as whoever has been identified as the first Chancellor of the German Empire in 
the context of association k is a conservative at the possible world where u1 takes place. In 
other words, assuming u1 to take place in the actual world, it follows that true(u1), since 
truec,k(7), that is, since Otto von Bismarck was in fact a conservative. 
As usual, the definition of a truth-predicate gives rise to corresponding Ômeaning-
groundedÕ notions, as in the informal idea of a sentenceÕs being Ôtrue by virtue of meaning 
aloneÕ. Given the classic notion of truthc for indexical languages, for instance, this idea is 
formally reflected in terms of truth by virtue of character alone, that is, in terms of truthc for 
all c.
 21
  Since the development of a double-context apparatus engenders doubly-relativized 
predicates such as truek,c, a formal rendering of the notion of Ômeaning guaranteed truthÕ must 
then be cashed out in terms of Ôcountenance guaranteedÕ truth, that is, in terms of truthk,c for 
all k and c. After a few further clarifications and developments, I devote the final section of 
this essay to a preliminary study of some properties of this notion, in turn intended as an 
                                                                                                                                                  
Chancellor of the German Empire) is the unique individual {Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire), 
k}(kw). 
20
 See Kaplan 1977 and Lewis 1980. 
21
 In the model theoretic analysis of the formal language LD in Kaplan 1977, this idea is developed in terms of 
truth in all models and contexts, in turn labeled by Kaplan as analyticity. 
 15 




6. Semantics C: Countenance and Designation 
Not unlike the eight-letter name-type ÔBismarckÕ, the Russell-name-type ÔBismarckÕ is in 
itself deprived of a semantic profile: what constitute the objects of semantic evaluation are, as 
common parlance puts it, ÔusesÕ of these expressions. In the case of Russell-names, what is of 
semantic interest is, in colloquial terms, ÔBismarckÕ qua abbreviation of, say, ÔRus(the first 
Chancellor of the German Empire)Õ, rather than of ÔRus(the largest German battleship in 
1940)Õ or for that matter ÔRus(the 1872 Minister President of Prussia)Õ.
22
 In the more 
theoretically laden terms from the foregoing sections: what matters is ÔBismarckÕ as it occurs 
in an utterance connected with an association involving, say, Ôthe first Chancellor of the 
German EmpireÕ, rather than some other description. 
Even with our attention firmly focused on the Ôfirst ChancellorÕ scenario, ÔBismarckÕ is 
strictly speaking only indirectly endowed with a semantic profile. Indeed, as hinted thus far 
and as more explicitly put forth in the Appendix, the immediate objects of compositional 
evaluation are not Russell-languages but their expansionsÑthat is, languages deprived of 
Russell-names but equipped with Rus-terms in their stead. Yet, given certain obvious 
background assumptions, a more direct and concise presentation ought to remain intelligible 
as a harmless shorthand for the officially authorized but cumbersome jargon. ÔBismarckÕ, I 
write henceforth, is endowed with the countenance 
|Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire)|, 
in the sense that utterances of ÔBismarckÕ in the by now familiar circumstances are evaluated 
on the basis of the semantic properties of that Rus-term, along the lines indicated thus far. 
In an equally harmlessly colloquial sense, then, ÔBismarckÕ may be described as 
designating an individual i with respect to a context (of association) k. In particular, 
ÔBismarckÕ, as it occurs in u1, designatesk Otto von Bismarck in the sense that, in the context 
of association k appropriate on that occasion, 
|Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire|(k) 
                                                
22
 The former example is an allusion to the Garman battleship Bismarck, destroyed by the British fleet in 1941. 
The latter appeals to Otto von BismarckÕs role as Minister President of Prussia, roughly concomitant with his 
position as Chancellor of the German Empire. 
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is a constant character concerned with that man. So, as indirectly indicated by this 
relativisation of the designation-relation, Russell-names conform to the satisfactional pattern 
characteristic of descriptivism: the relationship between ÔBismarckÕ and Bismarck is not 
semantically immediate, but results from the interaction between a descriptive condition and 
the idiosyncrasies of this or that context. 
Still, although the identification of a Russell-nameÕs designation is in a sense a contextual 
business, it is clearly not a Ôcontextual businessÕ in the sense of contextuality appropriate for 
indexicality. Indeed, in consonance with the Millian requirements put forth at the beginning 
of this essay, Russell-names are endowed with a constant character, and persist in their 
relationship with a particular designatum across occasions of utterance (or, as I put it, across 
contexts of interpretation). As a result, their satisfactional requirements fail to interact with 
those of overtly indexical expressions. Returning to example (5) from section three, for 
instance, 
(5) Napoleon is about to defeat Russia now 
may well truly be utterable as a description of a scenario in which, for no time t, whoever is 
French Emperor at t is in sight of victory over Russia at t, even on the assumption of an 
association of ÔNapoleonÕ with Ôthe Emperor of the French nowÕÑsee u6 in section three. 
Accordingly, then, Russell-names display a particularly idiosyncratic satisfactional 
pattern: though sensitive to the peculiarities of this or that context of association, their 
designation remains non-indexically indifferent to contexts of interpretation, and rigidly 
unconcerned with points of evaluation. In the double-context apparatus put forth thus far, this 
pattern is implemented in terms of the distinction between countenance and character: in the 
case of Russell-names (or, more precisely, their representative Rus-terms), character is a 
derived semantic property, obtainable on the basis of their countenance and of the choice of a 
particular context of association. As I am about to explain in the remainder of this section, 
this distinction yields interesting semantic consequences, which at least partly reflect the 
sense in which Russell-names conform to certain descriptivist desiderata. 
Unsurprisingly, a notorious type of example turns out to be particularly apt for guiding my 
discussion of this topic: true identity statements such as, in the case of ordinary proper names, 
(11) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
with ÔHesperusÕ and ÔPhosphorusÕ used qua names of Venus. From the viewpoint of the 
standard framework for indexical intensional languages, the Millian treatment of proper 
 17 
names entails that their semantic behaviour is fully reflected by a constant character 
responsible for the identification of (a constant intension yielding) what is commonly called 
its ÔreferentÕ. Since, as mentioned, character is accordingly understood as a non-derived 
reflection of an expressionÕs meaning, sentences such as (11) end up being true by virtue of 
character, that is, true in some sort of Ômeaning guaranteedÕ way.
23
 
The characteristically descriptive profile of Russell-names within the accompanying 
double-context apparatus is profitably highlighted by contrasting these conclusion with the 
outcomes ensuing in parallel scenarios involving Russell-names. Take for instance 
(12) Hesperus is Phosphorus, 
and assume that these Russell-names are associated with the obvious descriptive material, 
say, respectively Ôthe first object visible in the evening skyÕ and Ôthe last object visible in the 
morning skyÕ. Given any context k such that kw is astronomically sufficiently similar to the 
actual world, these Russell-names co-designatek. More precisely, for any such k, the character 
|Rus(the first object visible in the evening sky|(k) 
is the very same character as 
|Rus(the last object visible in the morning sky|(k), 
namely the constant function yielding (a constant intension yielding) Venus at all contexts. 
Accordingly, the identity claim in (12), or more precisely 
(13)  |Rus(the first object visible in the evening sky| = |Rus(the last object visible in the 
morning sky| 
is indeed once again recognized as true by virtue of character alone, in the sense that, given a 
context of association k as above, truek,c(13) for all c. Yet, a conclusion of this sort is hardly 
amenable to an informal gloss in terms of Ômeaning guaranteedÕ truth: as a result of the 
derivative status of character in a double-context framework, truth by virtue of character is 
achieved not only on the basis of the conventional properties of ÔHesperusÕ and ÔPhosphorusÕ 
(and, of course, ÔisÕ), but also on the basis of the peculiarities of k, the context of association I 
have chosen for my example. The sense in which truth is inevitably obtained independently 
of the idiosyncratic aspects of this or that context (and, of course, of this or that point of 
                                                
23
 As a result, the Millian commitments to rigidity and non-indexicality are commonly reflected in terms of the 
slogans that the meaning of a name Ôis simply its bearer (Reimer 2010), i.e., that it is Ôthe object to which it 
refersÕ (Braun 2006: 491). 
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evaluation) is rather now reflected by the idea of truthk,c for all k and c. And, clearly, for 
some k (and c), not truek,c(13)Ñin particular, for any k such that, at kw, the heavenly body 






Are there occurrences of Russell-names in English? In this essay, I remained deliberately 
silent when it comes to this question. As a result, my conclusions remain compatible with the 
ideas that (i) all expressions we commonly classify as proper names are Russell-names, (ii) 
some of them are, or (iii) none of them are.  
It is perhaps option (ii) that deserves particular attention from the viewpoint of natural 
language semantics, at least given the recurrent suspicion that some expressions commonly 
classified as proper names display idiosyncratic semantic properties not shared by run-of-the 
mill, ÔprototypicalÕ names.
25
 Admittedly, in the absence of arguments to this effect, option 
(iii) remains a possibility that should not be dismissed off hand. Yet, if Russell-names turn 
out to be nothing more that a philosopherÕs concoction, they do so only on the basis of 
considerations independent of the core Millian picture of proper names as rigidly non-
indexical, and of the arguments typically presented in its defence. Conversely, considerations 
supporting (at least some type of) a descriptivist approach to proper names may well lead 
Millians towards the direction of (i), or at least (ii), with no embarrassment for their 
commitment to a non-flaccid and non-indexical treatment of those expressions. The semantic 
admissibility of Russell-names thus opens an interesting conceptual niche in the traditional 
divide between Millian and descriptivist approaches to proper names, and paves the way for a 
more fruitful dialogue between these traditionally incompatible stances.   
                                                
24
 These conclusions (if flanked by a variety of independent considerations) may in turn be of relevance for a 
family of issue in philosophical psychology and the philosophy of mind, commonly gathered under the label of 
Ôcognitive valueÕ. It is in this respect that the details in what I called the ÔconnectionÕ relation between 
utterances and associations may deserve a much more attentive and detailed treatment than the highly tentative 
hints in footnote 7. Due to this essayÕs focus on issues in truth-conditional semantics, I leave these 
independently interesting issues as a topic for future developments of the idea of a Russell-language, and of its 
relation with Russell-speakers. 
25
 Some possibly promising areas of application may have to do with the various issues commonly subsumed 
under the label of Ôdescriptive namesÕ (see among many Kripke 1980, Donnellan 1970, Evans 1973, Evans 
1982, Evans 1985, Soames 2003, Jeshion 2004, Soames 2007, and Kanterian 2009). A distinct phenomenon 
perhaps amenable to a treatment grounded on the idea of Russell-names has to do with so-called Ônames that 
have grown capitalsÕ (see Corazza 2002 and Rabern 2014). These prima facie applications of my apparatus will 
unquestionably need to be assessed in their own right, on the basis of considerations independent of my 






(1) The Russell-Language L 
LexiconL 
1.! A set ICL of individual constants 
2.! A set PRL of one-place predicates 
3.! The indexical i; the determiner the; the modal operator Nec 
4.! A set RNL of Russell-names 
SyntaxL 
¥! for any F ∈ PRL, the F is a descriptionL (DL) 
¥! for any t such that t  ∈ ICL ∪ RNL ∪ {i} ∪ DL, t is a termL 
¥! and any termL t and F ∈ PRL, F(t) is a sentenceL 
¥! for any sentenceL S, Nec(S) is a sentenceL 
 
(2) The Expansion L* 
LexiconL* 
¥! ICL* = ICL  
¥! PRL* = PRL 
¥! The indexical i; the determiner the; the modal operator Nec 
¥! The operator Rus 
SyntaxL*: 
¥! for any F ∈ PRL*, the F is a descriptionL* (DL*) 
¥! for any d ∈ DL*, Rus(d) is a Rus-termL* (RTL*) 
¥! for any t such that t i ∈ ICL* ∪ {i} ∪ DL* ∪ RTL*, t is a termL* 
¥! for any termL* t and F ∈ PRL*, F(t) is a sentenceL* 
¥! for any sentenceL* S, Nec(S) is a sentenceL* 
 
(3) Utterances, Associations, Expansions 
¥! Let the class of contexts C be such that, for all c ∈ C, c = <ca, cw>, ca an individual 
and cw a possible world 
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¥! For any d ∈ DL, r ∈ RNL, and k ∈ C, <r, d, k> is an associationL 
¥! For any sentenceL S, c ∈ C, and associationL, a, the pair <<S, c>, a> is an utteranceL 
¥! For any utteranceL u of the form <<S, c>, a>, with a = <r, d, k>, the expansion of u is 
the triple <S*, c, k>, where S* is the sentenceL* resulting from S by replacing 
occurrences of r with Rus(d) 
 
(4) Semantics for L*: Models 








> such that 
¥! U
M
 is a non-empty class of individuals 
¥! W
M
 is a non-empty class of possible worlds 
¥! C
M
 is a non-empty class of pairs <ca, cw>, with ca ∈ U
M





 is a function such that, for any c, k ∈ C
M
 and w ∈ W
M
, 
o! for any a ∈ ICL*, I
M
(a) = a constant function f such that f(k) = a constant 
function g such that g(c) = a constant function j such that j(w) ∈ U
M
 
o! for any F ∈ PRL*, I
M
(F) = a constant function f such that f(k) = a constant 




(5) Semantics for L*: Countenance and Character 
The countenance |e|
M
 of an expression e of L* in a model M is a function such that, for any c, 
k ∈ C
M
 and w ∈ W
M
, 












 = the constant function f such that f(k) = the function g such that g(c) = the 
constant function j such that j(w) = ca 
¥! for any F ∈ PRL*, |the F|
M
 = the constant function f such that f(k) = the constant 
function g such that g(c) = the function j such that j(w) = the unique i ∈ U
M
 such that 
|F|
M
(k)(c)(w) if such i exists, and   otherwise.
26
 
¥! for any F ∈ PRL*, |Rus(the F)|
M
 = the function f such that f(k) = the constant function 
g such that g(c) = the constant function j such that j(w) = the unique i ∈ U
M
 such that 
|F|
M
(k)(c)(kw) if such i exists, and   otherwise. 
                                                
26
 Ô  is a completely alien entity, [not in] U
M
 ..., which represents an ÔundefinedÕ value of the functionÕ (Kaplan 
1977: 544). This solution is here adopted merely for the sake of illustration. 
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(k) (the character in the model M of the expressionL* e with 
respect to a context k) 
 
(6) Semantics for L*: Semantic Value 
¥! Notation: [[e]]
M
k,c,w = {e, k}
M
(c)(w) (the semantic value in the model M of the 
expressionL* e with respect to contexts k and c and possible world w) 
¥! For any sentenceL* S of the form F(t), F ∈ PRL* and t a termL*, [[S]]
M






¥! For any sentenceL* S of the form Nec(S1), [[S]]
M
k,c,w = T iff [[S1]]
M










k,c (S) iff [[S]]
M
k,c,cw = T 
¥! For any sentenceL* S, analytic(S) iff true
M
 k,c for all M and k,c ∈ C
M
 
¥! For any utteranceL u of the form <S, c>, <r, d, k>>, true(u) iff truec,k (S*), with c, r, d, 
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